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Chapter ii ♦
Promoting Hope in Children and Adolescents
Andrew J. Shatte,Jane E. Gillham, and Karen Reivich
T
he prevalence of depression has reached epidemic proportions. 
One in ten children experiences chnical depression before age 
14 (Garrison, Schluchter, Schoenbach, & Kaplan, 1989). As 
many as one in five adolescents suffers a major depressive episode before 
the end of their high school years (Lewinsohn, Hops, Roberts, & See­
ley, 1993). For many depressed youth, the future seems foreshortened 
and bleak—a pervasive sense of hopelessness is a prominent symptom 
of their major depressive disorder.
Suicide is the ultimate expression of this hopelessness. Suicide is the 
default option when all other courses of action have been eliminated as 
futile. Tragically, many of our youth do come to feel so profoundly 
hopeless. More than 8% of high school students in this country attempt 
suicide each year (Center for Disease Control, 1991). Each year, approx­
imately 13 in every 100,000 American adolescents aged 15 through 19 
take their own lives (Lewinsohn, Rohde, & Seeley, 1996). Paradoxically, 
this occurs against a backdrop of unprecedented opportunity for social 
and economic advancement.
This chapter examines the Penn Optimism Program—a depression 
prevention initiative for children developed at the University of Penn­
sylvania. There are two major components of the Penn Optimism Pro­
gram (POP), which together instill a sense of hope in children at risk 
for depression; the first is predominately cognitive and the second is 
largely behavioral. In the cognitive module, children learn to challenge
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their overly pessimistic attributions and predictions.Through this process 
participants learn to generate problem-solving options that tvere previ­
ously unavailable to them. The behavioral component equips partici­
pants with the skills to act on these options.
HOPE AND HOPELESSNESS
Clinical psychologists have traditionally adopted a disorder-oriented 
approach to personality, emphasizing the remediation of negative char­
acteristics over and above promotion of the positive. Consequently, sub­
stantially more research attention has been paid to the etiology of 
hopelessness than to understanding the development of hope.
Abramson, Metalsky, and AUoy have developed one of the most com­
prehensive models of the etiology of hopelessness and have proposed a 
corresponding hopelessness subtype of depression (Abramson, Metalsky, 
& AUoy, 1989). According to their theory, hopelessness is a proximal suf­
ficient cause of depression, and the final common pathway for aU other, 
more distal, causes of the subtype (Metalsky, Joiner, Hardin, & Abram­
son, 1993). They characterize hopelessness as the “expectation that 
highly desired outcomes wiU not occur or that highly aversive out­
comes wiU occur, with the further expectation that nothing is going to 
change this situation for the better” (Metalsky et al., 1993, p.ioi).The 
critical risk factor for hopelessness depression is a cognitive diathesis— 
the tendency to attribute negative fife events to stable and global causes.
Snyder and his coUeagues conceptuaUze hope as a journey, requiring 
a destination, a map, and a means of transportation. That is, a chUd prepar­
ing for such a journey needs weU-defined goals, knowledge of how to 
achieve those goals, and the determination and energy to act (Snyder, 
McDermott, Cook, & RapofF, 1997).They emphasize that this journey 
of hope “Uves first and foremost in our minds” (Snyder et al., 1997, p. 3).
The theories of Snyder and Abramson and coUeagues intersect at the 
realm of cognitions. For Abramson and coUeagues, attributions and 
expectations of negative valence are focal to hopelessness. For Snyder 
and coUeagues, hopefulness is the product of the synergy between
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mental representations of goals, pathways to goals, and mental energy 
(Snyder et al., 1997, p.y). It seems clear then that any program designed 
to promote hope and prevent hopelessness and depression should 
address cognitions, and the first half of POP is devoted to cognitive 
restructuring. But is this sufficient?
We contend that two conditions must be satisfied to foster hope in 
children. First, the child’s cognitive style must allow that, to a threshold 
degree, her situation is changeable, her goals are clear, and that desirable 
outcomes can be achieved. Second, the child must be equipped with the 
behavioral skills to successfully accomplish her goals. Neither condi­
tion is sufficient. If the at-risk child perceives that she can improve her 
life, but does not have the skills to act on that perception, then the win­
dow of hope will close. If the child believes that the causes of her prob­
lems will be around forever and will ruin everything she attempts, then 
she wiU feel helpless and hopeless whether or not she in fact has the 
social, academic, or introspective skills to advance her life.
In this chapter we examine how POP aims to promote hope in chil­
dren through training in cognitive and behavioral techniques.
THE PENN OPTIMISM PROGRAM
POP is a 12-week (24-hour),school-based intervention (see table ii.i). 
It is delivered in groups of eight to twelve children by a trained leader. 
POP is a manualized protocol in which the principles of cognitive- 
behavioral therapies have been calibrated for the appropriate develop­
mental age and recast in a preventive mode. Key aspects of cognitive 
theory are taught in brief didactic sections. Most of the session is 
devoted to scripted activities in which the participants try out the new 
skills.
Sessions 1 through 5 represent the cognitive component. In Sessions 
6 through 9 we teach more behaviorally-oriented skills. Sessions 10 and 
11 combine these skills with more hopeful thinking in a comprehen­
sive problem-solving strategy.
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Table 11.1
The 12-Session POP Agenda
Session # Cognitive/Behavioral Content
Session 1: The ABC Model
Session 2: Explanatory Style
Session 3; Generating Alternatives and
Evaluating Evidence
Session 4: Decatastrophizing
Session 5: The ABC’s of Family Conflict and 
Rapid-Fire Thought Disputing
Session 6: Assertiveness and Negotiation
Session 7; Relaxation and Other Coping Strategies
Session 8: Dealing with Procrastination 
and Social Skills
Session 9: Decision Making
Session 10: Problem Solving
Session 11: Problem Solving
Session 12: Review and Farewell Party
THE COGNITIVE ELEMENTS OF POP
There is now considerable research evidence indicating that children are 
vulnerable to the same cognitive distortions as adults, and that these 
cognitions are causal in the development of childhood and adolescent 
hopelessness and depression (e.g., Hammen, 1988; Kaslow, Rehm & 
Siegel, 1984). Many of the children who enter POP have cognitive styles 
that restrict their behavioral options and hamper their problem solving.
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The cognitive component introduces the participants to five skills 
designed to increase cognitive flexibility, expand the arena of possible 
solutions, and thereby maximize hopefulness: the ABC model, explana­
tory style, disputing of causal behefs, decatastrophizing, and rapid-fire 
disputing.
Cognitive Skill #i: The ABC Model
Session i encapsulates the focal role of cognitions in mood under the 
rubric of Elhs’s ABC model (ElHs, 1962; EUis & Grieger, 1977). EUis rec­
ognized that our lay understanding is that activating events (As) have 
direct emotional and behavioral consequences (Cs). For example, Tom 
fails to make the cut in the school baseball tryouts (A), feels depressed 
(emotional C), and never again tries for another sporting team (behav­
ioral C). However, EUis proposed that a mediating individual difference 
variable must be added to the model to explain why different people 
react differently to what is ostensibly the same event. For example, 
Linda’s failure to make the cut for basebaU, rather than leading her to 
give up on sports, inspires her to train harder for track. According to 
EUis, our beliefs (Bs) about the event and the meaning we attach to it 
directly cause what we feel and what we do (i.e., A-^B—>C). It is not 
the activating event per se, but rather Tom’s belief, “I’m a terrible ath­
lete,” that causes him to avoid all future tryouts. Conversely, Linda’s 
belief that she missed the basebaU cut because “I didn’t train hard 
enough” is energizing. Causal attributions (Session 2) and catastrophiz- 
ing (Session 4) are important belief subsets of ABC.
We convey the ABC skiU to participants using cartoons in three pan­
els, representing activating events, beliefs, and emotional consequences 
(see figure ii.i).The children are taught to describe objectively the 
activating event pictured in Panel A, providing only the facts of the sit­
uation without the actor’s interpretation (e.g.,“he missed the cut for the 
basebaU team” rather than “he messed up again” or “he’s a terrible ath­
lete”). Participants label the emotion on the face in Panel C and esti­
mate its intensity. FinaUy, the children fiU in the thought bubble with a 
belief that wiU make sense of the emotion, given the activating event.
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Figure ii.i. The ABC skill with 3-panel cartoons.
We believe that the skill is best internalized if the children practice it 
on situations in their own lives. For this reason we devote considerable 
class time to eliciting activating events from the children (e.g.,“My dad 
yelled at me when I broke the vase”), delineating the emotional conse­
quences (“I felt really sad”), and identifying the causal belief (“I always 
mess up”).The group leader helps the participants “tune in” to their 
automatic thoughts—the “self talk in their heads.”We utilize the group 
setting to spotlight the power of the model in explaining how different 
Bs lead to different Cs (e.g.,“I wouldn’t have felt sad. I would have been 
angry, because he shouldn’t yell at you if it’s an honest mistake”).
After several iterations most of the children learn the logic of the B- 
C connection, the link between their thoughts and their feelings.They 
become adept at identifying Bs that can explain their Cs. This is an 
essential skill. It is their cognitions that lead to helplessness, hopelessness, 
and depression.These cognitions are often inaccurate. Only by learning 
to identify their beliefs can they hold them up to empirical scrutiny.
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Cognitive Skill #2: Explanatory Style
We are predisposed to explain the adversities that bombard our Hves.We 
generate beliefs about their causes, and from these attributions we make 
predictions about our future. For both the hopelessness theory of 
depression (Abramson, Metalsky, & AHoy, 1989) and the reformulated 
learned helplessness model (Abramson, Seligman, &Teasdale, 1978), our 
habitual manner of explaining negative events, or explanatory style, is a 
significant causal risk factor for hopelessness and depression. Imagine a 
child who fails to make the school baseball team. Any belief she has 
about why she failed can be coded on three dimensions. First, causal 
explanations are relatively internal or external; that is, she will attribute 
the failure either to herself or to another person or circumstance (e.g., 
“I’m not good at baseball” versus “the coach has it in for me”). Second, 
she will attribute the failure to relatively permanent or temporary causes 
(e.g., “I don’t have good hand-eye coordination” versus “I wasn’t 
focused enough”).Third, the cause she infers wiU be relatively pervasive 
or specific, undermining everything she does or affecting only her base­
ball standing (e.g.,“I’m such a loser” versus “I’m no good at ball games”).
Pessimists are those who, in the wake of adversity, tend to infer inter­
nal, permanent, and pervasive causes. Conversely, optimists tend to gen­
erate external, temporary, and specific causal explanations. Each of the 
three characteristics of causal beHefs is dimensional, and any given causal 
belief can be located in this three-dimensional space. Over time we 
come to inhabit an idiosyncratic area in attributional space, and respond 
reflexively with causal beliefs that reflect this explanatory style. There is 
some research evidence that our style crystallizes by about age nine and, 
without intervention, remains stable across the life span (Burns & Sehg- 
man, 1989; Nolen-Hoeksema, Girgus, & Sehgman, 1986; Peterson, Selig­
man, &Vaillant, 1988).
Our perception of the controllabflity of adversity is represented across 
the three dimensions. External attributions indicate less control than 
internal beliefs, holding permanence and pervasiveness constant. Attri­
bution to permanent causes indicates uncontrollability across time, while 
pervasiveness suggests uncontroUability across life domain (see Shatte,
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Reivich, Gillham, & Seligman, 1998). Helplessness derives from the 
belief that we currently have no control over an adversity. We feel hope­
less when we believe that we will never be able to gain that control.
Many of the children who enter POP are reflexive pessimists. They 
automatically apply an internal, permanent, pervasive “cookie cutter” to 
the world whenever adversity strikes. “I didn’t make the team because 
I have no athletic ability” (internal, permanent, pervasive across sports). 
“She doesn’t flke me because I’m just not good with people” (internal, 
permanent, pervasive across interpersonal situations). “I failed the his­
tory class because I’m just plain stupid” (internal, permanent, pervasive 
across intellectual pursuits). In some cases, their attributions may reflect 
a reality. There are innate abilities and temperaments, normally distrib­
uted, which partially determine athletic and intellectual ability and 
interpersonal skill. But in many cases their pessimistic attributions are 
either inaccurate, or present only part of the causal picture (c.w.,“I’m 
not the best athlete in the school by any stretch of the imagination, but 
I didn’t practice that much before the tryouts either”).
In Session 2 of POP, we liken the concept of explanatory style to an 
individual’s fashion style—a habitual way of thinking just as we have 
habitual ways of dressing. We focus on the internal and permanent 
dimensions since they are easier constructs for the children to grasp. We 
introduce two cartoon characters to represent pessimism and optimism 
(Gloomy Greg and Hopeful Holly) and the children act out several skits 
depicting each until they are confident using the two dimensions. We 
guide the children to an understanding of their own style as well as the 
recognition that any causal explanation is merely one view of the 
world—one possible belief in response to that adversity.
Cognitive Skill #3: Disputing Causal Beliefs
Adversities typically are multifactorially caused. To the extent that we 
obstinately endorse the causal explanation derived from our explanatory 
style, we will fail to recognize the richness of the causal picture. Since 
we use our behefs about the cause of our problems to generate possi­
ble solutions, our problem-solving options will also be restricted. The 
first step in disputing, then, is to generate alternative causal explanations.
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Figure 11.2. Generating alternatives using j-panel cartoons.
We begin teaching the requisite cognitive flexibility in Session 2, 
again using cartoons (see figure 11.2). We present children with an 
adversity in Panel A and with either a highly internal or permanent 
thought in Panel B.The participants are expected to describe the logical 
behavioral and emotional consequences of the pessimistic causal belief, 
generate a more optimistic alternative, and delineate how the initial and 
new behavioral and emotional responses differ. Participants are encour­
aged to generate four or five alternatives that span the three explanatory 
style dimensions. In the ‘sister’ example presented above, some ‘tempo­
rary me’ alternatives to the actor’s initial ‘permanent me’ explanation 
(i.e.,“I’m a terrible sister”) could include “I’m sometimes careless with 
my sister’s things,” or “I don’t pay attention to when she’s about to get 
angry,” or “this time I took something she really cares about.” At other 
times we may encourage the children to generate external causes, as 
counterpoint to the extreme pessimism of the initial belief (e.g., “she 
gets so angry over nothing”). Returning to our baseball tryout exam­
ple, if the child’s initial beliefs are reflexively optimistic, he is taught to
generate less optimistic beliefs that indicate some responsibility for the 
adversity (e.g.,“maybe 1 didn’t train hard enough”).
The next step in disputing is the skill of evaluating evidence—adduc­
ing evidence from one’s life to determine the accuracy of the initial and 
alternative causal beliefs. Cognitive therapists often compare this to the 
scientific process—generating several hypotheses and testing each against 
the available empirical evidence. In POP we use a detective analogy. A 
good detective, Hke Sherlock Holmes, comes up with a full hst of suspects 
(initial belief plus alternatives) and looks for clues (evaluates evidence). 
Some suspects, it will be discovered, have a convincing alibi.This process 
is comparable to disproving a causal belief (“well 1 guess it’s not true that 
I have no athletic ability, because I do ok at tennis and that takes athletic 
ability too”). Bad detectives conclude that the first suspect that popped 
into their heads (initial belief) must be guilty, without checking on the 
suspect’s whereabouts on the night in question (evaluating evidence).
The process of generating alternatives and evaluating evidence taps 
into the complexity of adversity. Many factors contribute to problems 
in varying degrees.The alternatives and evidence process helps children 
analyze the relative importance of several candidate causal explanations. 
POP participants are taught through a series of activities to incorporate 
the results of their search for alternatives and evidence into a pie chart, 
in which each piece of pie corresponds to a causal belief, and with the 
size of each slice reflective of causal significance (see figure 11.3).
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B I’m not a good athlete 
35%
O I didn’t train in batting stance 
and swing 25%
I I’m lazy 
10%
O I didn’t train hard enough 
15%
H I don’t have what it takes 10%
The coach doesn’t 
like me 5%
Figure 11.3. The pie chart maps the relative contribution of all causes.
A highly pessimistic belief, such as “I have no athletic ability, is a 
road block to problem solving and hope. As an initial behef, it represents
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100% of the problem. Only after generating plausible alternatives and 
evaluating evidence is its true contribution revealed. Disputation may 
determine that a lack of athletic ability indeed explains a considerable 
portion of the variance in who made the cut and who did not. How­
ever, only through disputing can the child recognize the role of physi­
cal conditioning and batting practice—two causes over which the child 
can exert some control. As such, disputing is a skill that offers children 
hope for the future.
Cognitive Skill #4: Decatastrophizing
Implicit in any causal attribution is a prediction about the future role of 
the adversity. Highly permanent attributions indicate that the problem 
win continue to affect the person’s life for a substantial time period. If 
combined with a high degree of pervasiveness, then helplessness and 
hopelessness are likely outcomes.
Pessimistic thoughts about the future tend to come in a catastrophic 
chain, the first Hnk of which is an adversity that the child explains pes­
simistically. The following example represents an amalgam of anecdotes 
from our experiences implementing POP.
Josh has noticed that his parents have been arguing more and 
more over the last six months. Every day now they seem to fight, 
shouting at each other and slamming doors. Recently he even 
heard his mother cry out, making him wonder if his dad had hit 
her. Today his mother yelled out to his dad, “You’re a rotten 
father.” His father had forgotten to pick him up after practice 
and Josh had to take a bus home—and this is not the first time.
Josh thinks, “It’s all my fault. I’m so messed up even my dad 
doesn’t want to hang out with me. My dad’s going to leave 
because he can’t stand being with me. I’ll never see him again.
My mom won’t be able to take care of all us kids. I’ll probably 
end up in a foster home. If that happens I’U have to run away. I 
know what happens to kids Hke that.They end up on the streets 
and go to prison.”
226 SHATTE, GILLHAM, AND REIVICH
This tendency to catastrophize can be countered by using the skill of 
generating the worst case, best case, and most Hkely scenarios. The first 
step is to flesh out the entire causal chain, from current events through 
to the child’s worst fears—the worst case scenario. For Josh, the chain is:
Arguing —> divorce —> absent father —> financial
hardship foster home —> runaway —> prison
Second, we estimate the likelihood of the final link in the chain, that 
Josh will end up in prison. Children, and adults, with pessimistic styles 
will tend to inflate the probability, perhaps giving estimates of one in ten 
or even one in three.The link to link nature of the chain ofbeHefs con­
tributes to the tendency to exaggerate the probabflity of the catastrophic 
outcome. The step from the present reahty to the final belief is enor­
mous; imagine how our prisons would fill if we were imprisoned 
because our parents argue. However, the step from arguing to divorce 
is not absurd, nor is that between runaway status and prison. Neverthe­
less, catastrophic chains are a string of conditional probabilities—the 
probability that Josh’s parents will get divorced given their arguing, the 
probabflity that Josh will never see his father again or get financial sup­
port given a divorce, and the probability that Josh would run a.way given 
his being sent to a foster home, etc. Therefore, the probabflity that the 
entire chain will play out is calculably small.
The next step in the skill of decatastrophizing is to generate some best 
case scenarios of similar probabflity (e.g., “his parents will never fight 
again because their struggles have caused them to bond more closely”). 
Best case scenarios provide a positive anchor to the negativity of the cat­
astrophic chain. Finally, using worst and best as balances, we teach the 
children to generate most likely outcomes and devote most of their 
problem-solving resources to what is most probable, rather than what 
is most feared.
The skill of decatastrophizing provides children with a method of 
evaluating the accuracy of their expectations that “highly aversive out­
comes will occur” (Metalsky et al., 1993). By so doing it provides a 
direct challenge to hopelessness.
Cognitive Skill #5: Rapid-Fire Disputing
The effectiveness of the cognitive skills in preventing depression and 
hopelessness is contingent upon their utility. If the children cannot 
employ the skills when most needed, then the hope they offer wiU soon 
fade. Specifically, they must be effective in the real world, outside of 
POP, away from worksheets and supportive leaders. When pessimistic 
thoughts assail us they are fast and reflexive. In order to repel them suc­
cessfully, the cognitive skills must operate as fast and reflexively. When 
negative thoughts arise, the child must be able to respond immediately 
with an alternative, some counter-evidence, or decatastrophizing. This 
skill is called rapid-fire disputing.
We teach this skill in POP using a game called the Hot Seat.The chil­
dren are presented with a hypothetical adversity (e.g.,“It’s the first day 
of junior high and you don’t feel like anybody likes you”). The leader 
reads a hst of negative thoughts to the children and asks them to dispute 
on-Hne (e.g.,“rU never have any friends.”“nobody hkes me because I’m 
too boring,” “If I were better looking, people would like me,” “I’m 
going to be lonely for the rest of the year”). From its introduction in 
Session 4, rapid-fire disputing is practiced in every session.
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THE BEHAVIORAL ELEMENTS OF POP
As stated earlier, while the cognitive skills afford the child the hope that 
change is possible, they do not provide the skills required to effect that 
change. In the second half of the program, POP participants receive 
training in some action-oriented, behavioral skills that are an essential 
part of many problem-solving strategies, including assertiveness and 
negotiation, countering procrastination, and decision making. We illus­
trate the additive nature of the cognitive and behavioral aspects of POP 
in the following three scenarios.
Scenario #1: Disputation and Assertiveness 
Becky and her friend Debra have plans to meet at the mall after
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school, but Debra fails to show for the third time this month.
Becky feels very sad for the next few days and avoids Debra at 
school.
Becky uses the ABC technique to identify her initial beHef that “peo­
ple just don’t like me because I’m boring” and to help understand why 
she has been feeling so depressed. Next, she generates some alternatives 
to her initial causal belief, including “Debra doesn’t like me,” “She’s not 
good at keeping dates with anyone,” “She’s very forgetful,” “Some peo­
ple find me boring,” and even “Debra’s a jerk,” She uses evidence and 
the pie chart to determine that while Debra can be inconsiderate, the 
biggest slices of pie correspond with her forgetfulness, especially when 
it comes to appointments.
Since this is a more external and specific attribution, the disputing 
work is likely to alleviate Becky’s sad mood. In addition, it offers greater 
opportunity for change, since forgetfulness, even on the part of another, 
is more easily remedied than being unlovable. But as effective as this 
cognitive technique is, the problem with Debra remains. Indeed, reat­
tributing to an external cause wiU hkely give rise to mild anger or frus­
tration. Clearly, Becky must do something more than clarify her 
perception of the adversity and its causes. She must do something about 
the adversity itself, that is, Debra’s pattern of standing her up. She can 
achieve this by talking assertively with her and negotiating a mutually 
agreed upon plan of action for the future.
Scenario #2: Disputing and Procrastination
Jimmy’s teachers know he’s a pretty bright kid, but it almost 
never shows in his grades. His biggest problem is getting writ­
ten assignments turned in on time. Getting him started on those 
essays is like puUing teeth. He’ll even clean his room to avoid 
writing that paper.
Procrastination is a behavioral consequence of maladaptive beliefs. 
When Jimmy applies the ABC model with the help of his POP leader, 
he identifies several behefs that cause him to avoid getting started. When
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he has a paper to write, he often thinks “I have to get this just right to 
get a good grade.” In combination with his recurring beHefs that “I’m 
a terrible writer” and “this project is just too big for me to get through,” 
the situation seems hopeless. Using disputing he comes to reahze that 
he could get a good grade even if the paper isn’t perfect. But he still has 
trouble beheving that the assignment is manageable. The behavioral skiU 
of the graded task is valuable here. In the graded task, the child learns 
to break the entire project into ten or so meaningful and manageable 
chunks. For Jimmy, these may include “go to the library and check out 
some relevant books,” “read the first book,” “write a brief summary of 
it,” “read the second book,” “write a brief summary,” “make a page by 
page outline for the essay,” “write the introduction,” “write section i,” 
“write section 2,” “write the conclusion,” and “turn in the paper.” At the 
successful completion of each subtask, Jimmy has a reward planned for 
himself—two hours ofTV, a movie, or a computer game.
Scenario #5; Decatastrophizing and Decision Making
Lisa saw two classmates cheating during her science exam. She 
is currently on the B/C grade boundary, and this was her last 
chance for the semester to improve her grade. She knows that 
her sixth-grade science teacher grades on a curve. She has to 
decide whether or not to tell the teacher. If she does, the other 
kids may find out. But, if she keeps it to herself her grade could 
suffer.
Lisa clearly faces a dilemma. She uses decatastrophizing to more accu­
rately determine the probable outcomes of each option. In so doing, she 
realizes that if she were to teU, she would probably have a tough time 
interpersonaUy. However, she now recognizes that it is highly unlikely 
that no one wiU ever be her friend again, which was her worst fear. 
Her analysis also indicates that her catastrophic behef that she wiU fail 
the course were she to keep the information to herself is also improb­
able. This cognitive work has eased her anxiety considerably, but she 
still faces a tough choice.
POP Session 9 teaches the children a systematic approach to decision
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making. In the case of a binary choice, participants draw up a simple 
two-by-two table and list the costs and benefits of pursuing each course 
of action under consideration. They weight those outcomes that are 
particularly saHent to them—^perhaps due to their ethics. In a future-ori­
ented version of the pie chart, Lisa can estimate the probability of each 
outcome (the group leader’s approach to this activity is more directive 
with younger children). She can also flag any especially desirable or 
aversive outcomes.
THE PROBLEM-SOLVING PROCESS
In this chapter we have presented snapshots of the cognitive and behav­
ioral skills taught in POP, and how they combine to foster hope and pre­
vent depression and hopelessness. Of course, these do not capture the 
true iterative nature of problem solving. For any adversity, the partici­
pants learn to foUow a multi-step process. First, they apply ABC— 
objectively describing the adversity, identifying the beliefs, and 
understanding the effect of these behefs on their emotions and behav­
iors. Second, if their negative thoughts are beliefs about cause, they gen­
erate alternatives, evaluate evidence, and determine the relative 
contribution of each causal factor. The skill of decatastrophizing is 
applied to beliefs about future implications. Third, they use their more 
accurate beliefs about the causes of events as the basis for generating 
possible problem-solving strategies. Fourth, they use decision-making 
skills to prioritize their plan of action, based on the changeabiHty of 
the causes, their degree of contribution, and the hkely outcomes of pur­
suing that plan. Fifth, they enact the plan using the behavioral skills of 
POP—social skills, assertiveness and negotiation, or the graded task. 
Sixth, they evaluate the success of the strategy in achieving their goals, 
and modify and reenact when necessary. This final step reflects the iter­
ative nature of real-world problem solving. It requires resihence in the 
face of setbacks and disappointments, which in turn requires a sense of 
hope that the cognitive skill of disputing provides.
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THE EFFECTIVENESS OF POP
In the first empirical test of POP, 140 children in fifth and sixth grade 
were assigned either to POP or a no-intervention control (Jaycox, 
Reivich, Gillham, & Seligman, 1994).The children were selected as at 
risk for depression due to their self report of depressive symptomatol­
ogy and their perception of family conflict and cohesion at home. They 
completed the Children’s Depression Inventory (Kovacs, 1985) every 
six months for two years following the final session of the 12-week pro­
gram (see figure 11.4).The final sample numbered 118.
Children in POP experienced significantly fewer symptoms of 
depression than their control group counterparts across the 2-year eval­
uation period (CiUham, Reivich,Jaycox, & Seligman, 1995).Analysis of 
the proportion of children experiencing moderate to severe levels of 
depressive symptoms indicates that POP halved the rate of depression 
in at-risk children.
Prevention Control
Screen 1 1.7 1 l.l
Pre 9.1 lO.I
Post 7.6 8.9
6 Month 7.8 9.9
12 Month 6.4 9.5
18 Month 7.3 12.4
24 Month 9.1 13.3
Figure 11.4. Depressive symptoms (mean CDI) by prevention condition and time.
Furthermore, children in POP remained significantly more optimistic 
than controls. These findings suggest that POP fostered a sense of hope, 
which buffered these children against the adolescent increase in risk for 
depression.
Since this study, our research attention has focused on two corollary 
issues—dissemination and active ingredients. We have developed a 
protocol for training educators and counselors as POP leaders. In order 
to examine the change process, we designed a specific-component con­
trol, an alternative, affective-interpersonal intervention called the Penn
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Enhancement Program, or PEP. Early empirical indications are that 
middle school teachers can be trained to be effective implementers of 
POP. Our initial research with PEP has raised treatment specificity ques­
tions—girls seem to benefit more from PEP than POP. Our research 
agenda continues to isolate and test process hypotheses involving issues 
of program content and group dynamics.
We believe that both the cognitive and behavioral skills in POP are 
active ingredients of the observable changes in helplessness, hopelessness, 
and depression. The cognitive elements instill hope in the child who 
once believed that the problems in her life were caused by uncontrol­
lable permanent and pervasive factors. The behavioral component 
equips the child with the resources to act on that hope. If these newly 
acquired skills fail her at first, she has the cognitive tools to challenge the 
behefs about failure that previously led to helplessness and hopeless­
ness. She has a resilience that comes from hope.
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